What You Should
Know About Megaprojects and Why: an Overview, in the April/ May 2014 Project Management
Journal
I
just finished reading the lead article,
What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: an Overview, in the April/
May 2014 Project Management Journal. This was an invited article from PMI
written by Bent Flyvbjerg from Oxford University.
Flyvbjerg
presented the current state of megaprojects providing an overview of the
current market and trends, a general conclusion that there are a huge number of
problems with megaprojects, the source of these problems in a couple
recommendations. A historical analysis of the development of your project was
very interesting and included a number of statements that needed backup. For
example, he said: “when projects of such as go wrong entire company’s national
economies suffer.” This may be a logical conclusion but in a research oriented
journal I would say he would need to present data to back up his point. He also
included the stimulus package that was passed by Congress in response to the
banking crisis as a project and the major acquisitions program portfolio of the
United States Department of Defense. By including these programs within his
discussion of projects he has blurred his arguments.
Flyvbjerg
been listed a number of megaprojects that went wrong; over cost, late, not meeting
the specifications and leading to a negative ROI. The list of projects that
that one or more these criteria for an underperforming project was impressive.
One of the most valuable parts of the article for me was a list of challenges
that are inherent in megaprojects and are not typically dealt with in planning
and executing megaprojects. In paraphrasing these challenges list included:
1.
megaprojects
are risky
2.
planners
and managers don’t have the appropriate skills
3.
stakeholders
have conflicting interests
4.
technology
is typically new and untested
5.
overcommitment
to project without justifiable data
6.
optimism
bias
7.
significant
changes over time
8.
ignoring
events that could cause risk for the project
9.
inadequate
contingency
10.
misinformation
about cost, schedule, benefits, and risk
Although
I believe this list has a lot of validity, it would’ve been helpful to have
some data that supported the belief. In a later section we also indicated that “front
in planning this scant and bad projects are not stopped”. These types of
conclusions cry out for citations.
Flyvbjerg
quoted from the Standish Group research about the number of failed projects and
I believe this detracted from his argument because of the flaws in this
research that has been pointed out.
One
of the more interesting parts of the paper was the discussion of the Hirschman’s
Hiding Hand. In short, this is the intentional underestimate of a project in
order to get approval. Flyvbjerg presented several situations where the
original estimate of the project was intentionally at the level to be approved
with knowledge that the estimate was significantly lower than the anticipated
actual cost. In the construction industry recalled this “lowballing” an
estimate. Companies would bid on projects at or below cost with the knowledge
that there would be sufficient changes that could be created that will enable
the company to make a profit. The art was estimating how you could go and how
many changes could you create to have a successful project. I watch the
original estimates for the new nuclear power plant proposal that went to the
utilities commission in South Carolina. With my limited experience in this industry
I estimated the cost to be at least double what was submitted to the utility
commission. After initial approval, every update provided to the utility commission
included at least a 10 to 15% increase in the estimate. I find it difficult to
believe that the people making the estimate and probably the people accepting
the estimate and making approval did not know that the true cost will probably
be double.
Flyvbjerg
suggested that there are number of drivers that lead to these intentional
underestimates. He also recommended that companies and governments establish
significant consequences for anyone or any organization that intentionally
provides misinformation in these processes. He also gave several examples where
countries are taking a step including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and
Australia. It also appears that many private organizations are relying more on
consultants to evaluate project bids more closely. Flyvbjerg suggest that we
cannot solve problems that we do not talk about and cited Pres. Obama’s
identification of costly overruns, fraud and abuse, and endless excuses as key
policy problems, is one indication of a lease beginning to talk about these
issues.
As
I’ve addressed in other post, I believe this is indicative of where we are in
the project management profession in the issues addressed in this article are
not exclusively related to megaprojects. One of my focuses the best several
years has been to better understand our projects. I believe the tools and
techniques for developing a good understanding of the project are not well
developed and without a good understanding of the project it is difficult to
develop an appropriate execution approach. See my other post on project
profiling.
One
of the things I’ve discussed in earlier posts has been the breaking up of large
projects into smaller components. Most organizations have a project size and complexity
comfort zone and when the project gets too far out of that zone is important to
break the project down into smaller projects that can be managed independently
and coordinated from a program point of view. This approach should have had
some mention in Flyvbjerg’s article.
The
article is worth reading and does provide a good overview of some of the issues
surrounding megaprojects as well as some of our project execution as a whole.
It is important to put on the table that much of this underestimating of
project costs is intentional and that’s difficult for the project manager to
address and project execution.
Russ